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4This study analyses the spin-out activity in
seven technology transfer units, which are
considered to be successes in Europe: Crealys
in France, the Top Initiative of the university
of Twente in the Netherlands, Leuven R&D
at the KUL in Belgium, Business Develop-
ment at IMEC in Belgium, BioM  in Germany
(Munich area), Technology Transfer Partners
(TTP) and Scientific Generics, both in Cam-
bridge, UK. In each of these institutes, an in
depth analysis is made of how they organise
the following activities: (1) sensibilisation
and Detection of opportunities, (2) manage-
ment of IPR, (3) selection of spin-out proj-
ects, (4) incubation and business plan prepa-
ration, (5) financing of these spin-outs and
finally (6) the follow-up of spin-outs after
start-up.  
Based upon the analysis of these activities,
three different models have been defined: a
self selective model, a supportive model and
a protective model. In the first model, the
specific aim is to generate as many start-ups
as possible. Stimulating general entrepre-
neurship rather than financially or economi-
cally attractive companies are thus the goal.
This means that sensibilisation and opportu-
nity seeking is the main activity. In the sec-
ond model, the emphasis lies on creating
economically attractive companies with a
transitional starter profile. These companies
might not yet have a financially attractive
business plan but have the ambition to
make one in the future. Usually they are
based upon the IP generated in the mother
institute. Management of IPR and business
plan preparation are crucial activities in this
model. Finally, the protective model focuses
on the creation of financially attractive com-
panies, which receive VC-money at start. In
addition to the previous activities, also
financing activities are of crucial importance
here.
In addition to analysing the activities devel-
oped in each of these models, also the
resources necessary to organise these activi-
ties are examined. In the first model, the cru-
cial resources seem to be an experienced
entrepreneur as manager who can sensibilise
students, researchers and professors to start
up a company and public money to facilitate
this start up. In the second model, a finan-
cially autonomous organisation is needed
which is strongly supported by the top man-
agement of the university in its activities.
This organisation needs to have a minimum
critical mass of people specialised in legal
issues, IPR and business plan development. In
addition, a public-private early stage.
Capital fund is needed to support the start-
ups. Finally, the protective organisation
needs a worldwide recognised leading
research team in a particular technology.
The tech transfer or business development
unit needs to be able to incubate the organ-
isation and facilitate the recruitment of
external management, attraction of interna-
tional early stage venture capital and the
formation of the company’s intellectual
property base.
SUMMARY
5The number of research-based spin-offs has
increased sharply in Flanders since the sec-
ond half of the nineties. A preceding IWT-
Study* recorded more than 100 in total.
Although this number of firm creation and
the employment in these companies seem to
have only a limited impact on the Flemish
economy, this spin-off phenomenon is of
great importance for the development of
the Flemish innovation system and for eco-
nomic renewal of the Flemish economy in a
longer-term perspective.  Spin-off activities
are indeed a good indicator for the intensi-
fication of science-industry relations in the
Flemish innovation system and carry a prom-
ise for new growth opportunities. 
The success of this complex process of spin-off
creation is dependent on multitude of con-
ditions, ranging from a further market-
oriented development of the innovative 
technology, of course, to a whole set of com-
plementary conditions that are necessary to
create a business venture. To facilitate this
process all Flemish universities have estab-
lished ‘interface services’. These services are
building up quickly experience on different
levels of commercialisation of research
results. They play a central role in the cre-
ation of a conducive environment of spin-off
creation at the universities. The Flemish gov-
ernment supports the activities of interface
services already many years. With its Decision
of 13 September 2002 it provides a frame-
work for a structural support to the interface
services that allows them to develop their
activities in a long-term perspective.
IWT has been allocated a role of coordina-
tion of all innovation intermediaries in the
1999 Innovation Decree. Part of this mission
is also a platform for the exchange of expe-
riences among the interface services. In sup-
port in this exchange of experiences the
IWT-Observatory has been involved in
benchmarking activities. One of the inputs
in this ‘learning’ process is international
benchmarking. IWT has participated in the
European STRATA network on ‘The Role of
Technology Policy in Incubating European
New Technology Based Firm's' (INCUPUB),
together with the Vlerick School of Manage-
ment. Some of the results of international
bench-marking on the support to spin-off
creation by facilitating services has been
analysed and synthesised in a recent report
to the European Commission under the
redaction of Professor Bart Clarysse, also
associated with the IWT Observatory. It is
this report that is presented now in the IWT-
Studies series. The Study contributes to pol-
icy thinking and policy development.
Although the results have to be interpreted
as a ‘snapshot’ in the quickly evolving land-
scape of ‘spin-out models’, the message is
clear that the interplay of actors, according
to their resources, reacting to changes in the
environment, is at the hearth of the design
of successful models of spin-off creation.
One of the important new elements con-
tributing to the success of spin-off creation
in the proceeding period was the emer-
gence of a venture capital sector in Flanders.
What will be the effect of the recent crisis in
this sector? 
IWT has a role of complementing ‘risk capi-
tal’. Recent research conducted by the
Vlerick School of Management has given
strong indications on the great significance
of this role in the recent past. A survey
among 68 research-based start-ups has
shown out that nearly 60% obtained invest-
ment from venture capitalists (totalising 80
million Euro) and more than 75% subsidies
by IWT (totalising 40 million Euro). On aver-
age the part of subsidies amounts to nearly
50 % of the capital. With the present crisis
of venture capital the role of IWT in remedi-
ating market failures might increase.
Financing is a key element in the overall pic-
ture of success conditions offered by several
types of ‘facilitating services’.
Paul Zeeuwts
President IWT
FOREWORD
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Spinning off new ventures from research
institutions has played a key role in the devel-
opment of high-technology clusters such as
Boston and Silicon Valley (e.g., Roberts 1991;
Saxenian 1994). Also in Europe, the phenom-
enon of spin-out — companies created to
commercialise technologies developed in
research institutions — is not new. Some
well-known large firms were started by 
scientists in the 19th century or the early
part of the 20th century. Werner von
Siemens and Gerard Philips set up spin-offs,
which would later develop into well-known
multinationals (Mustar 1995). However,
these spin-outs did not result from any struc-
tural process of research commercialisation.
Often, these companies were founded by
entrepreneurs despite the research institute
with which they were associated. Only
recently, research institutes have devised
“pro-active “ policies to stimulate the com-
mercial exploitation of public research,
through spin out formation (e.g. Callan
2001; European Commission 1998). In paral-
lel, there have been changes in the institu-
tional environment to make such a policy
possible: laws have been changed to assign
ownership of intellectual property to
research organizations. Employment laws
have been loosened to allow public sector
researchers more contact with the private
sector and various initiatives introduced to
provide early stage start-up capital. 
Despite these changes, detailed knowledge
of the processes of proactively spinning out
new ventures from research institutions
remains scarce, especially in an environment
where high tech entrepreneurship is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. Roberts and
Malone (1996) stress in a pioneering article
that the process of spinning-out ventures
from research institutions is very different in
those contexts compared to the entrepre-
neurial environment of Boston or Silicon
Valley. In developed contexts, such as the
latter two examples, there is already a
strong entrepreneurial community with the
capability to select the best projects and
allocate resources to them. So, the spin-off
process can follow a “business pull” process,
which is not dependent alone on the activi-
ties of research institutions. In contrast, in
contexts, where no strong entrepreneurial
community is present, research institutions
need to be more proactive and supportive of
spin-off projects. Here the process is more
“technology push” in which research institu-
tions exercise selection and provide support.
In a recent study about spin-outs in Belgium,
Degroof (forthcoming) distinguished six
activities, which can be organized by these
research institutions or universities to pro-
vide spin-out support: (a) Technology oppor-
tunity search; (b) Intellectual property
assessment and protection; (c) Selection of
spin-off project; (d) Incubation or business
plan development; (e) Support with start-up
process and (f) Funding process.
This paper analyses (a) the extent to which
parent organizations differ in how they
organize and manage the activities involved
in the spin-out process; (b) what resources
are needed to successfully undertake spin
out process and (c) whether differences in
the organization and management of the
spin out lead to more spin-outs of a certain
type. These research questions are
addressed in the following way. In line with
Eisenhardt’s (1989) view on building theory
from case study research, European cases,
with a proven and widely recognized track
record in spinning out new ventures were
selected. Based upon these cases, three dif-
ferent models of spin-out activity were dis-
tinguished: a protective model, a supportive
model and a low selective model. We
analyse these three models in the light of
the research questions outlined above. In
addition, using the resource-based theory of
the firm as a theoretical framework (Barney,
Wright and Ketchen, 2001), we assess which
resources these institutes use to successfully
organize their activities.
The paper unfolds along the following lines.
First, we discuss the methodology that
guided our data collection and analysis. The
paper concludes by returning to the question
of the context within which these activities
are set and draws implications for policy. 
C h a p t e r  1 INTRODUCTION
7

The impetus that triggered this research
project originated from observations in the
field rather than theory. We therefore found
it more appropriate to adopt an inductive
design, drawing upon insights from the field
with the aim of building hypotheses and
possibly theory (Eisenhardt 1989). This
approach also seemed justified by the fact
that the literature on the technology trans-
fer function in Europe is limited and rather
descriptive. In addition, much of the litera-
ture on organization theory and entrepre-
neurship is US-centred. Despite the growing
interest in the commercialisation of research
by academics as well as policy makers, very
little seems to be known about how tech-
nology transfer activities, and spinning off
processes in particular, are organized in the
parent institution.
RESEARCH DESIGN:  MULTIPLE CASES,
HIERARCHICAL CASE SELECTION
In order to identify different spin-out activi-
ties, we started with an analysis of the
regions where the science and technology
base was present. Therefore, a European
map of scientific regions of excellence was
prepared by our research group. Using the
number of publications and patents per
capita and the total R&D expenditures as a
percentage of GDP as indicators of technol-
ogy poles, following regions were identified
(Clarysse, Heirman and Degroof, 2001): Île
de France and Rhône-Alpes in France,
Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium, South-
east England (London/Cambridge) in the UK,
the Netherlands3, Baden-Württemberg,
Bayern and the Heidelberg-Stuttgart-Mann-
heim triangle (Germany), Northern Italy
(Triangle Milan-Bologna-Pisa) and, finally,
the capital regions of Sweden and Finland. 
In each of these regions a local university
researcher was contacted to participate in
the study using a network financed by the
European Commission as a vehicle. Because
of travel and communication difficulties, the
Finnish and Swedish research groups con-
tacted did not want to participate. Each of
the researchers in the network was asked to
identify in his region technology transfer
units who are associated with universities or
public research institutes that had active
spin-out services. This process resulted in a
list of 45 services distributed over the differ-
ent regions. 
An exploratory phone interview was under-
taken in each of these cases to analyse the
extent to which the spin out policy was
developed in each of the institutes. Among
the 45, 11 spin-out services were selected for
further analysis based upon the following
criteria: (1) they needed to be founded at
least before 1997; (2) they needed to have a
documented record of spin-outs; (3) the
local researchers had to consider them as
“interesting” examples of successful spin-
out activity. Their perception was based
upon references made in the telephone
interviews to these institutes. Seven cases
appeared to be interesting: Scientific
Generics and TTP in the UK; Leuven R&D and
IMEC in Belgium; BioM in Germany; Uni-
versity of Twente in the Netherlands and,
finally, Crealys in France. In comparison to
the other cases on the list, the spin-out activ-
ity in these institutes appeared better devel-
oped. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data on each case was collected through a
variety of techniques including personal
interviews with several persons4 in the insti-
tutes and secondary data sources such as
annual reports, web sites and descriptions
of the institutes in local press... For each of
the institutes, the way they organized the
spin-out process was mapped using the dif-
ferent activities of spin-out management
defined by Degroof (2002) as a guideline.
The first phase of a spin-out process itself,
starts with the extent to which the institute
engages in a technology opportunity
search consisting of trying to identify tech-
nologies with a commercial potential.
Second, it can be followed by an intellec-
tual property assessment consisting of
assessing if patents have been already filed
for the specific technology and, if not, per-
haps filing one or more patents. This step
can involve examining the choice between
options of commercialisation, primarily the
choice between licensing and commercialis-
ing through a spin-off venture. Third, the
process involves selection of the spin-off
C h a p t e r  2 METHODOLOGY 
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3 No data at regional
level are available for
the Netherlands,
Finland and Sweden.
4 The persons selected
to be interviewed were
mostly in a manage-
ment position at the
institute.
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CHAPTER 2  > Methodology
project based on its intrinsic potential and
on the comparison with alternative proj-
ects. Fourth, once the project is selected
and a team volunteers to carry it out, or is
selected to carry it out, a phase of business
development plan is necessary. Fifth, once a
business plan exists and is accepted,
research institutions channel their spin-off
process towards some forms of funding
process. Sixth, once funding is obtained,
the venture can formally be incorporated,
at which point the research institution, or
another party can provide start-up coach-
ing. Although in practice, the founding of
spin-outs is not as linear as presented in
this step model, it offers a good compara-
tive framework against which to map the
activities by the different institutions. Using
a structured questionnaire5 as a guideline,
we assessed to which extent and how each
of the interviewed spin-out services organ-
ised or was engaged in the particular activ-
ity. For instance in the case of technological
opportunity search, we examined the
degree to which different tasks such as
‘informal visits to the research labs’, ‘organ-
isation of a business plan competition’,
‘structured brainstorming with research
groups’, ‘mapping of the research activity’
were carried out by the spin-out service. 
We did not only analyse the activities of
spinning out new start-ups, also the
resources that were developed to efficiently
organize these activities were looked at in
depth. The resource-based theory of the
firm was used as a theoretical framework to
classify these resources: human (individual
skills, knowledge), social (external relation-
ships, networks), financial (budget), physical
(infrastructure), organizational (routines
and procedures developed) and technical
(access to science/technology base) were dis-
tinguished. Concerning the seven successful
cases, we analysed to which extent the
resources that were present were crucial to
organize the activities described above. The
four failed cases were – to the extent possi-
ble – used as a benchmark to assess the
importance of not having certain resources.
10
5 The questionnaire is
available upon request
Based upon the data collected in each of the
eleven cases selected, three different types
of spin out models were compiled: (a) the
low selectivity model; (b) the supportive
model; (c) the protective model. 
3.1 “LOW SELECTIVITY” MODEL
The TOP initiative in Twente, Crealys and
Atelier de l’Innovation in France converge in
terms of activities and resources towards a
certain model, which we label the “low selec-
tivity” model. We discuss below which activi-
ties and resources are specific for this model.
Activities
A. Opportunity Seeking. In contrast to the
two other models discussed below,
opportunity seeking remains very pas-
sive in the low selectivity model. Crealys
and Atelier de l’Innovation limit their
opportunity seeking to regular visits by
TTO- staff to departments of the univer-
sities and public research laboratories.
Twente refers to the entrepreneurial
mission of its parent university as a main
driver of spin-out activity (Karnebeek,
2001). 
C h a p t e r  3 THREE TYPES OF SPIN-OUT SERVICES
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CASE 1 > THE TOP CASE 
(THE UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE) 
Resources
A. Organizational resources. TOP is a pro-
gram that is executed by the Dutch
Institute of Knowledge Intensive Entre-
preneurship (NIKOS) from the University
of Twente since 1984. It is funded with
support from the ERF, managed by the
European Commission. 
B. Human resources. There are many people
from the University of Twente involved.
The TOP-coordinator and some secretarial
support (total 2 fte) and the people
(2/TOPPER) from research groups who are
hosting the entrepreneur during his TOP-
year. There are also two permanent mem-
bers of the TOP review committee from
outside university. 
C. Technological resources. TOP supports
every start-up company who is active on
one of the fields of knowledge of the
University of Twente and is able to link up
with a research group.
D. Physical resources. The entire university
acts as an incubator. The entrepreneur has
almost the same access to offices and lab
facilities as a researcher has. There is also
a special incubator building near the cam-
pus where the University of Twente is one
of the shareholders. There every tenant
has to pay rent.
E. Financial resources. Every TOP entrepre-
neur receives an interest free personal
loan of 12.000 euro during the TOP year.
For this purpose a revolving fund of
1.000.000 euro is available.
F. Social resources. The networks from the
research group and TOP committee are
available for the TOP entrepreneurs
Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. TOP is well known
in the University of Twente and in the
region. Every research group sends their
potential TOP entrepreneur to the TOP
coordinator who will guide and prepare
the entrepreneur for the selection proce-
dure.
B. IPR assessment and protection. Every TOP
entrepreneur makes his own agreements
with the research group/faculty on this
subject. There is a university attorney to
advise the research group and the entre-
preneur.  
C. Selection of the spin-out process. If the
research group is willing to host the
entrepreneur, they need to write a busi-
ness plan. It is also important that they
have more than 30 ours per week avail-
able for their company. Since 1984 310
entrepreneurs received a TOP position in
several research groups. 
D. Incubation process. Every research group
can act as an incubator. 
E. Funding. University is just beginning to
invest in TOP companies. Recently in 1 TOP
company.
F. Control of the spin-out process. After the
TOP-year the TOP company has to leave
the University but if they still want to use
university facilities they have to pay for
that. During the TOP year the TOP com-
mittee evaluates the progress. 
> 
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7 Annual Report of ‘les
incubateurs publiques’.
CASE 2 > THE BIOM CASE
Resources
A. Organizational resources. BioM is a pri-
vate organization that was created by the
State of Bavaria, VC companies and the
local Pharma and Chemistry industry as a
result of the BioRegion Competition in
Germany in 1997.
B. Human resources. BioM employs 13 peo-
ple: 4 scientists with a Ph.D.; 3 scientist
without a Ph.D.; 2 people with a commu-
nication background; 3 people with an
economic background. The managing
director and CEO, Prof.. Dr. Domdey is a
professor of Biochemistry and co-founder
of 2 spin-out companies called Medigene
AG and Swith Biotech Gmbh. The board of
directors exists out of professors of nearby
located universities and people represent-
ing financial institutes. 
C. Technological resources. BioM only sup-
ports companies situated in the biotech-
nology sector and in the life sciences sec-
tor. BioM has well-established contacts
with 5 institutes: Max-Planck-Institut für
Biochemie,Max-Planck-Institut für Neuro-
biologie, the Ludwig-Maximilians-Uni-
versität, the Technical University of
Munich and GSF (Forschungszentrum für
Umwelt und Gesundheit)
D. Physical resources. BioM does not have an
own incubation centre, but has developed
a close relationship with IZB (the CEO of
BioM is the scientific CEO of IZB). IZB owns
2 incubation centres in the area of
Munchen. 
E. Financial resources. ioM has already
invested approximately 8 million EURO in
spin-out companies. Within Germany, a
lot of grants exist to support spin-out
companies. 
F. Social resources. The fact that BioM is
created as an initiative originating from
various industrial companies, contributes
to the well-developed contacts of BioM
with the industry in the area of
Munchen. 
B. Selection of the Spin-out Project. The
selection criteria or entry barriers are
quite low and not based upon growth
orientation. For example, In the last 2
years, Crealys received 160 projects of
which the selection committee approved
60 projects7. University of Twente
selected in the last two years about 60
projects out of a total of 130
(Karnebeek, 2001). The interview data
suggest that in both cases the formal
representation of the project play a
larger role than the practical test of the
assumptions. It is illustrative that Crealys
selects projects based upon two criteria:
they have to be based upon technical
developments and they have to be will-
ing to cooperate with the research insti-
tute they spin off from. 
C. IPR Assessment and Protection. With
regards to the IPR situation, the technol-
ogy transfer office of the parent research
institute or university is likely to patent
the basis technology but this is unlikely to
be the key trigger to start-up a company.
This unimportance of IPR is again very dif-
ferent from the two other models. For
example in Twente, only 7% of spin-outs
founded after 1980 had a formal IP posi-
tion (e.g. a patent).
D. Incubation process. In this model, start-
ups stay within the parent research
organisation. 
E. Funding. Public money is crucial to fund
these early stage projects. It is illustrative
that the Twente entrepreneurs regard
the start-up fund they get from the uni-
versity as a means of sustenance rather
than as start-up capital. 
F. Control of the spin out process. A wide
range of businesses is selected. Among
them, as in any start-up population,
many will are small, with very low levels
of capitalization, more locally or nation-
ally focused. Among all projects started
by Crealys in France, only about 10%
resulted in a growth oriented venture
capital backed company. This percent-
age is similar as the one we would
expect among a natural population of
CHAPTER 3  > Three types of spin-out services
start-ups in technology intensive sectors.
Atelier de l’Innovation went broke
because among its 30 projects in the
pipeline, none could establish a real
growth orientation.
Resources
A. Organizational resources. The spin-out
service tends to be a broker or match-
maker between the researchers within
the university(s), the public sources of
finance and the administration. In
Twente, Crealys and Atelier de
l’Innovation this match making function
was of extreme importance.
B. Human resources. In line with this match
making function, he spin-out unit
employs a small team of people who are
familiar with the existent programs of
the government to receive grants. 
C. Technological resources. In contrast to
the other models, the spin-out services in
this model do not have a technological
focus.
D. Physical resources. Office space and infra-
structure are organized within the uni-
versities and do not play a determining
role. 
E. Financial resources. In order to organize
this kind of activity, the spin out service
should have control over public money.
Crealys received 1,5 mio Euro (spread over
3 years) of the “Ministère de la recherche”
because it was selected as public incubator
in the call for projects. Crealys also receives
each year 200 000 Euro of the City of Lyon,
1 mio Euro of the region Rhone-Alpes and
500 000 Euro of the associated universities.
Twente uses money from the European
Social Fund. Atelier de l’Innovation was an
entirely privately financed initiative and
went broke.
F. Social resources. The success of this
model seems to be very dependent upon
the social network, which the spin-out
service has developed with various public
agencies and the relation with the
research departments or institutes with
to which it is attached. 
13
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Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. If a researcher got a
good idea, he first goes to the Technology
Transfer office within his own university.
The TTO will mostly encourage him to
take part to the Business Plan Com-
petition. Within the region, there exist a
company called “Business Plan Competi-
tion”. This is a company whose main (and
only) goal it is to organize a BP competi-
tion within the Munich area. This com-
pany is giving BP advice to all companies
in a very early stage. Once a researcher
has a good BP (not prerequisite with help
of the Business Plan Competition), he can
come to BioM with his BP. 
B. IPR assessment and protection. BioM does
not offer specific IPR support, but they
have established close contacts with
patent attorneys.  
C. Selection of the spin-out process. Since
the start, BioM has received 130 business
plans and has invested directly in 28 spin-
out companies. BioM received 12 business
plans in 1997, 36 business plans in 1998, 30
business plans in 1999, 22 business plans in
2000 and 30 business plans in 2001. The
total number of 130 business plans con-
tains some business plans counted double,
due to the fact that some business plans
return to BioM after a major change at
the business plan.  
D. Incubation process. BioM does not have
an own incubation centre, but operates as
contact point in the search for housing the
spin-out companies. BioM offers business
plan advice, provides contacts to patent
attorneys, offers support with grant appli-
cations and organizes networking events.
E. Funding. BioM invest a maximum of 
250 000 Euro in spin-out companies and
takes shares of the companies on average
around 7 %.
F. Control of the spin-out process. BioM con-
siders themselves as a private VC company
in an early stage, which does not focus on
high growth companies. In BioM, 35% of
the spin-out companies have already
received venture capital financing.
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3.2 “SUPPORTIVE” MODEL
The Leuven R&D case, the BioM case and
Heidelberg Innovation are three initiatives,
which can be seen as “supportive models” of
spin-out activity. 
Activities
A. Opportunity Seeking. Opportunity seek-
ing is organized in the same way as a VC:
the spin-out service attracts business
plans. 
B. Selection of the Spin-out Project. Under
this model there are clear selection criteria.
For a business plan to be selected, it has to
show growth, product-, and international
orientation (in the long term). BioM
received 130 business plans in the last 5
years. They invested directly in 28 spin-out
companies. Leuven R&D aims at starting up
5-7 projects each year and has accepted 18
projects in the last two years (Debackere,
2001). The criteria look like those used by
VCs, but the assumptions in the business
plan are usually less elaborated.
C. IPR Assessment and Protection. The com-
panies founded in this model are usually
single patent companies. It is clear that
no technology platform is built through
licensing in pieces of technology to com-
plement the existing technology. Never-
theless, Leuven R&D, BioM and Heidel-
berg consider the availability of a patent
as a crucial factor. 
D. Incubation process. Under this model
more incubation support activities and
facilities are provided although they are
not necessarily owned by the spin-out
service. Usually the spin-out service has
some kind of formal collaboration with
an incubation centre. For instance, BioM
has developed a close relationship with
IZB (the CEO of BioM is the scientific CEO
of IZB). IZB owns 2 incubation centres in
the area of Munchen. 
E. Funding. This type of model in general is
involved in some kind of public/private
partnership fund. For instance, in Leuven
R&D the fund is owned 20% by the uni-
14
CASE 3  > THE LEUVEN R&D CASE
Resources
A. Organizational resources. Leuven R&D is a
department of the “Katholieke Universi-
teit Leuven” that was founded in 1972
and currently managed as a small-applied
research centre with a large independ-
ence of the “Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven”. 
B. Human resources. Leuven R&D employs 20
people, of whom 6 people are responsible
for the financial succession, 4 people are
administrative forces and 10 people pro-
vide services to researchers to commer-
cialise the research results. The group of
10 people exists out of 3 engineers, 2
lawyers, 3 people who studied life sciences
and who have followed a patent attorney
course, and 2 economists. 3 employees
have already several years of business
experience. 
C. Technological resources. Leuven R&D has
no specified technological focus, but it
tends to focus on IT and Biomedical Ven-
tures, due to the strength of the “Katho-
lieke Universiteit Leuven” in this area. 
D. Physical resources. The “Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven” and the city of
Leuven are the owners of an incubation
centre located in Leuven. Leuven R&D
conducts the management of the incuba-
tion centre, which offers only space to
spin-out companies of the “Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven”.
E. Financial resources. Leuven R&D is self-
sustainable and gets his revenues out of
research contracts, patents and spin-out
companies. The “Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven” asks 7% overhead costs for each
research contract. 5/7 of these revenues
go directly to Leuven R&D. The same prin-
ciple is used for the revenues generated
by patents and spin-out companies.  
F. Social resources. Leuven Inc. is a non-
profit organization created by 5 compa-
nies: Arthur Andersen, Fortis Bank, IMEC,
KBC and Leuven R&D. Leuven Inc. is an
organization that facilitates networking
between different companies and organ-
izes courses to promote high tech entre-
preneurship. Due to the close link with
Leuven Inc., Leuven R&D has well-devel-
oped contacts with the industry. 
> 
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versity and 80% by a consortium of major
banks in the area, which see this invest-
ment as a window on opportunity. This
fund is usually organized as a VC fund.
The invested amount of money ranges
from 250 000 Euro to 350 000 Euro per
business plan. 
F. Control of the spin out process. Control
happens through the board of directors.
This kind of control results in a higher
percentage of VC backing. In Leuven
R&D, 25% receive venture capital financ-
ing in a second round of financing within
the first three years. In BioM, 35% of the
spin-out companies have already received
venture capital financing. These percent-
ages might increase if time evolves.
Resources
A. Organizational resources. These spin-out
services usually have developed routines
and skills in terms of business plan devel-
opment and market research. From an
institutional point of view, they tend to
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be organised as private non-profit
organisations. In contrast to the previous
model, they are much less a broker
between the public sector and the com-
pany and much more a consultant.
Heidelberg innovation for instance has
its own team of experienced consultants
to help start-ups in business plan devel-
opment.
B. Human resources. The human resources
of this model are likely to be more expe-
rienced in enterprise creation than under
the previous model. Leuven R&D,
Heidelberg Innovation and BioM have a
small team of 3-4 people, which have
experience in setting up entrepreneurial
technology ventures (either as consultant
or entrepreneur). Therefore, they can
have an impact on the selection process
performed by the fund with which they
collaborate.
C. Technological resources. Under this
model the technological resources are
likely to be more focused towards parti-
Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. The activities of
Leuven R&D are well known among the
researchers of the “Katholieke Universi-
teit Leuven”. So, there is no need to per-
form an active search to look for opportu-
nities to commercialise. 
B. IPR assessment and protection. Leuven
R&D employs a few patent attorneys to
perform IPR support. 
C. Selection of the spin-out process. In some
cases, the spin-out service gives support to
write a business plan. However, the spin-
out service mainly focuses on giving sup-
port during the phase of the evolution of
a business plan to a business model. Once
the business model exists, further advice is
offered through settling in the Board of
Directors. 
D. Incubation process. Leuven R&D manages
an incubation centre, and offers all sup-
port necessary to start-up a spin-out com-
pany (business plan advice, patent
searches, patent portfolio management,
assisting spin-out companies, assisting
Leuven Inc.’s activities,…) 
E. Funding. Potential spin-out companies
can receive capital from 3 sources: reserves
from the department, Gemma Frisius Fond
and external investors. Some departments
build up their own reserves, which they
use to extend their research group and to
give financial support to promising
research projects. The Gemma Frisius Fond
was created in 1997 as a joint venture
between the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven (represent by Leuven R&D) (20%),
Investco (currently KBC Investment, 40%)
en VIV (currently Fortis Private Equity,
40%) and is a 12,5 mio Euro fund. The
Gemma Frisius Fond invests in a spin-out
company in the stage of validation of the
business plan. The fund invest around 250
000 to 350 000 Euro per project. The exter-
nal investors only invest in the second
round of financing of a spin-out company.
F. Control of the spin-out process. A spin-out
company is set up in an early stage, but
receives substantial support from Leuven
R&D. In Leuven R&D, 25% receive venture
capital financing in a second round of
financing within the first three years.
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cular specific technologies. For instance,
BioM and Heidelberg Innovation have a
focus on biotechnology while Leuven
R&D is more focused upon IT (and some
biotech).
D. Physical resources. As suggested earlier
physical resources will be more devel-
oped under this model. In Heidelberg
Innovation, BioM and Leuven R&D the
availability of an incubation centre and a
science park is very important to the func-
tioning of the service although space is
offered at market prices. 
E. Financial resources. The combination of
private and public capital is crucial for the
survival of this model. For instance, BioM
is financed by three parties: a consortium
of tbg8 and private VCs, the State of
Bavaria, and the local pharma industry.
BioM is thus a clear example of public-pri-
vate partnership. The amount of public
capital involved is about 50%. BioM
receives money both to invest and to pay
its management expenses, which are far
above the 3% norm that is normal in the
VC industry. Also Leuven R&D is a pub-
lic/private partnership. The management
of its VCFund, Gemma Frisius, and the
business plan assistance is paid with pub-
lic money. The VC fund itself is a joint
venture between the Katholieke Uni-
versiteit Leuven (represented by Leuven
R&D) (20%), KBC Investment (40%) and
Fortis Private Equity (40%) and is a 12,5
mio Euro fund. It is exactly on this topic
that Heidelberg Innovation was different
from BioM and Leuven R&D. In contrast
to the previous two, the amount of pub-
lic money in Heidelberg Innovation col-
lected through the BioRegion scheme
was very small (almost negligible). The
fund thus acts as a private investor, who is
interested to make efficient investments,
which are limited in risk. However, the
coaching of entrepreneurs in business
plan development, the assistance in IP
matters, the composition of a real ‘team’
is a kind of overhead that can not be sup-
ported by private investment funds. As a
result, Heidelberg Innovation now acts
solely as a pure VC fund.
F. Social resources. Because start-ups are
helped to develop a business plan that is
presentable to a VC fund which selects
proposals according to the private VC cri-
teria, a well elaborated network and
close links with the local industry, special-
ized advisors and the VC community are
important. These links help the spin-out
service to attract business developers in
the pre-start-up phase, business angels in
the advisory committees, patent attor-
neys…
3.3 “PROTECTIVE” MODEL
IMEC9, TTP10, the Scientific Generics case, the
Twinning case and STARLAB were function-
ing according to a model which we have
labelled the “protective model”.
Activities
A. Opportunity Seeking. Opportunity seek-
ing activities is very pro-active and usually
at a very early stage of the research.
Usually, these institutes look for all kinds
of interesting path breaking research in
certain disciplines, which might lead to
results that can be commercialised. The
creation of a start-up is only one vehicle
to commercialise. IMEC is a leading edge
applied research institute in the field of
microelectronics and looks for projects at
a very early research stage in the differ-
ent universities in Flanders. 
B. Selection of the Spin-out Project. In terms
of project selection an in house fully inte-
grated approach is identifiable under this
model covering the technology, the com-
mercial viability, financial requirements
and managerial competence. By and
large, evaluation is rooted in the techni-
cal and commercial expertise of the
organization. It is important that spin-out
is only one potential vehicle for commer-
cialisation. Only when a research project
is considered to be financially attractive
(in terms of exponential growth), a com-
pany will be created.
C. IPR Assessment and Protection. The IPR
policy differs quite substantially from the
previous two models. Once a project is
chosen to have spin-out possibilities, the
IPR policy aims at building a technology
platform through licensing in other
pieces of the technology and cross-licens-
ing some parts.
16
8 Technologie
Beteilungsgesellschaft,
a specific project within
Germany’s public bank,
which uses public
money to take minority
investments in high
tech start-ups.
9 InterUniversity
Institute for Micro-elec-
tronics
10 The Technology
Partnership in
Cambridge, UK.
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CASE 4  > THE IMEC CASE
Resources
A. Organizational resources. IMEC is a centre
of excellence in the field of microelec-
tronics, and was set up in 1984. 
B. Human resources. Within IMEC, 2 depart-
ments are busy with the transfer of tech-
nology to the industry, namely the
Business Development Group and the
Realization and Incubation Department.
Within the Business Development Group,
5 people are working full time on writing
patents and on following up patent pro-
cedures. Within the Realization and
Incubation Department, 10 people are
employed: 6 engineers, 1 lawyer, 2 econo-
mists and 1 secretary. 3 of the 6 engineers
have already 10 years of business experi-
ence. The Realization and Incubation
Department is responsible for the tech-
nology transfer to the Flemish SME’ and
for the spin-out companies.    
C. Technological resources. IMEC is a centre
of excellence in the field of microelec-
tronics. IMEC has a number of associated
laboratories: Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Rijksuniversiteit Gent, Limburgs Univer-
sitair Centrum and Katholieke Hoge-
school Brugge-Oostende. 
D. Physical resources. Because the origin of
each spin-out company lies within the lab,
internal office space is offered for free
and infrastructure is available. 
E. Financial resources. In 1999, IMEC had a
budget of 75 mio EURO: 40 mio EURO
came from contract research, the remain-
ing 35 mio were subsidies granted by the
Flemish government for fundamental
research. The revenues created out of
contract research came from the interna-
tional industry (43%), the Flemish indus-
try (32%), the European Union (20%), the
European Space Agency (2,5%) and the
government (2,5%). In 2001, IMEC had a
budget of 115 mio Euro: 88 mio Euro
came from contract research, 27 mio Euro
came from the Flemish government. 
F. Social resources. The spin-out services are
self-contained and self sufficient, because
all stages and processes involved in spin-
out creation happens within IMEC.
Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. IMEC searches very
actively for project at a very early
research stage in the different Flemish
universities. 
B. IPR assessment and protection. IPR sup-
port is fully covered by IMEC.
C. Selection of the spin-out process. The
selection of a project happens at a very
early stage. All potential projects are
screened with the target to set up 1 or 2
spin-out companies a year. 
D. Incubation process. The spin-off service
provides all kinds of support ranging
from management and housing of the
applied research projects to the provision
of offices and meeting rooms for early
stage spin-outs, business plan develop-
ment, recruitment of external manage-
ment and the composition of their tech-
nology platform. The incubation process
has thus both a long time horizon and
aims at offering a fully in-house support
service.
E. Funding. Since January 2002, IMEC owns
an incubation fund. This fund was set up
by IMEC, Fortis Private Equity, KBC
Investco and the Software Holding
Finance. The incubation fund is a 5 mio
Euro fund, which invest 500 000 Euro per
project. Currently, the incubation fund
has invested in 2 potential spin-out com-
panies. Once the spin-out company leaves
IMEC, IMEC does not invest anymore. The
spin-out companies then have to find
money with venture capitalists or busi-
ness angels. The requested amount of
money usually varies between 1 to 6 mio
Euro. Before the incubation fund was
present, IMEC invested non-officially by
paying the human resources costs of the
people working in the potential spin-out
company. Once the company spun out,
IMEC asked 15 to 25 % of the shares in
return. 
F. Control of the spin-out process. A spin-
out company is start up in a late stage
and with an experienced management
team. ). 
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D. Incubation process. The spin-out service
provides all kinds of support ranging
from management and housing of the
applied research projects to the provision
of offices and meeting rooms for early
stage spin-outs, business plan develop-
ment, recruitment of external manage-
ment and the composition of their tech-
nology platform. 
E. Funding. Both the time scale and nature of
the project supported mean that funding
requirements are substantially greater
than under the other two models.
Typically, spin outs from this model start
with a capital of 1-4 million euro. To estab-
lish these firms, the institutes maintain
good contacts with the larger Venture
Capital Community. Through their pre-
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CASE 5  > THE GENERICS CASE
Resources
A. Organizational resources. Scientific
Generics was founded in 1986 by Gordon
Edge as a spin-out of PA Technology. The
Generics Group, comprises Generics Asset
Management Limited (GAMI) responsible
for the investment side of the group,
Scientific Generics, which undertakes
technical and business consultancy, Catella
Generics, a Swedish based consultancy in
battery and fuel cell technology, GenTech,
which is the incubation arm of the group
and Genesis Medical Technology a US
based company providing medical prod-
uct development services. The Swedish
based Catella acquired a controlling inter-
est in the group in 1996. 
B. Human resources. The UK parts of the
group (Scientific Generics, GAMI and
GenTech) employ approximately 250 peo-
ple at the Group’s base. The majority of
employees have a strong scientific or tech-
nical background combined with commer-
cial experience. Several senior consultants
from Arthur D. Little (formerly Cambridge
Consultants) have recently joined
Generics. GenTech itself has a dedicated
staff of 5, but all potential spin-out proj-
ects are assessed by the Group’s
Innovation Exploitation Board (IEB) which
draws upon a wide range of Generics pro-
fessionals, depending on the nature of the
proposal.
C. Technological resources. As a technical
consultant Generics has specialist expert-
ise in communication technology involv-
ing both data and voice and fixed and
wireless technology including Bluetooth
technology, in engineering with sensing
and metering applications, particularly in
respect of medical products and in life sci-
ences and bio informatics. 
D. Physical resources. Generics’ has extensive
physical resources on-site at its location at
Harlston Mill just outside of Cambridge. It
has a wide range of laboratory facilities
including a CommsLab for communication
technology work. It has recently obtained
permission to double the size of its facili-
ties at Harlston, increasing both labora-
tory and office space available to poten-
tial spin-out companies.
E. Financial resources. Consultancy fees and
income from IP (licences, and equity in
spin-outs) indirectly provide resources.
Consultancy fee income last year was 27
million euro and Generics Group holds IP
valued at 40 million euro. The IEB will con-
sider potential spin-out projects gener-
ated outside of the Generics Group, but
they will bring in-house and treated and
supported in the same way as projected
generated by Generics employees. 
F. Social resources. Generics is one of a small
number of technical consultancy firms,
which have become a notable feature of
the Cambridge high tech environment.
Generics, and especially its founder
Gordon Edge have a very high profile in
the local Cambridge business environ-
ment. Generics funds the first prize for the
Cambridge University Entrepreneurs com-
petition, it is at the forefront of the
Cambridge 3G Mission (a communication
technology application test network) for
which it is the project manager.  It is an
active member of the Cambridge Network
and of the GEIF (Great Eastern Investment
Forum) a group of business angels.
Facilities in Sweden and the USA further
extend the resources to which it has
access. 
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ferred partnerships and informal networks
with this community, they attract financ-
ing for their spin-outs at founding. In addi-
tion, most of them have their own VC
fund, which co-invests in the spin-outs and
often considers investing in spin-ins as
well. No public money is involved. 
F. Control of the spin out process. We have
labelled this model 'protective' because
it provided extensive in house support
from idea generation right the way
through to final separation. The stage 
at which, and process by which separa-
tion occurs may vary: TTP is like a
Portuguese-Man-of-War, a colony of
related but independent organisms, sep-
aration is referred to as ‘demerging’ and
at this stage the ‘spin out’ may be very
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Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. In setting up
Generics Gordon Edge aimed to establish a
creative environment dedicated to the
exploitation of technology.  The organiza-
tion has a flat structure and this is reflected
in the physical configuration of the space:
open plan offices and glass walled labs to
remove barriers to communications.
Employees are encouraged to be inventive.
At the core of the incubation model is the
IEB, which meets monthly to review inno-
vative ideas presented by consultants,
Generics employees and external sources.
The IEB may also approach people with a
view to encouraging them to come up with
innovative suggestions.  The company has a
Reward to Inventors Scheme, which
encourages employees to be innovative. 
B. IPR assessment and protection. Generics
initially owns all the IPR in respect of its
developments, occasionally, depending on
the nature of the external contract, this
might be shared with another organisa-
tion or client.  Generics seeks to establish
platforms of IPR on which it can base
future development and has a proactive
approach to this in respect of its consul-
tancy work. Last year it made 268 patent
applications.  When a company is spun out
Generics would initially retain 100% of the
equity. Depending on subsequent funding
those employees who championed the
venture and left Generics to join the new
company might subsequently be left with
up to 20% of the equity.
C. Selection of the spin-out process.
Selection of projects is made by the IEB at
its monthly meetings.
D. Incubation process. Once a project has
been deemed interesting by IEB, resources
and funding are allocated to the project.
GenTech will write the business plan, han-
dle the IP issues, evaluate markets and
organize the development of the technol-
ogy and, where appropriate, the building
of prototypes. Essentially the concept is
‘matured’ within the protective walls,
(both physical and legal) of Generics.
When it becomes apparent that the value
of the new business is sufficiently estab-
lished Generics will create a spin-out com-
pany, initially retaining 100% of the
equity.  Generics employees championing
the venture will normally leave Generics
at this stage to staff the new company and
will be awarded some percentage of the
equity, but depending on the nature of
the spin-out external professionals may
also be bought in.  
E. Funding. Generics has an internal fund of
3-4 million euro to provide seed and early
stage support. Indirect support in also pro-
vided through the use of the Generics
facilities.  Because of its extensive contacts
with sources of angel and venture capital
obtaining additional and development
funds for spin-out companies is not prob-
lematic. 
F. Control of the spin-out process. Potential
spin-out companies remain within the
protective environment of Generics until
such time as their commercial and techni-
cal viability can be demonstrated. Com-
pared to many other schemes therefore
separation is relatively late with the ven-
ture having a relatively developed prod-
uct/service, actual or clearly identified
potential customers/ clients and a devel-
oped management team. However
Generics has a clear objective of making a
return on spin-outs through trade sales or
IPO. To date, Generics has spun out 7 com-
panies. 
CHAPTER 3  > Three types of spin-out services
large, employing 100+ and may go
straight to IPO. Separation in Starlab,
Twinning, Generics and IMEC is earlier,
often with a trade sale in Generics and
Starlab and always through VC involve-
ment in IMEC. In all cases, the spin out
will have a well-development profes-
sional management team, which will
probably involve outsiders.
Resources
A. Organizational resources. The organiza-
tions of this model are centres of excel-
lence and independent institutes with a
steady revenue stream. Twinning had the
same activities as the other examples, but
was not a centre of excellence in re-
search. Instead it had to tap upon the uni-
versity resources and did not have the in-
house scientific expertise. Neither could it
build a portfolio of contract research and
20
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Resources
A. Organizational resources. The Technology
Partnership was founded in 1987 by 25
people, largely as a spin-out of PA
Technology.  Although a plc TTP is three
quarters owned by its staff.  It has three
wholly owned subsidiary companies:
Acumen Bioscience Ltd, TTP Ventures
Limited, a venture capital fund and The
Creativity Partnership involved in consul-
tancy and training. 
B. Human resources. TTP employs approxi-
mately 400 people, the majority are scien-
tifically or technically qualified but there
is a strong emphasis on commercial expe-
rience. 
C. Technological resources. TTP’s undertakes
software design, development and manu-
facture of advanced diagnostic instru-
ments, product development and develop-
ment of automated manufacturing
systems.  It has specialist expertise in the
following areas: software, micro-electro-
mechanical systems, micro-fluids, optics
and opto electronics and lasers, modelling
and sensors, and the development of inte-
grated biology/ hardware solutions.  The
applications of its development work
range from electronic aerosol technology
for inhalation drugs, through digital print-
ing, to sensors for the residual contents of
envelopes and drug discovery platforms.  
D. Physical resources. TTP has extensive phys-
ical resources on-site at its location on the
Melbourne Science Park to the south of
Cambridge.  It occupies the majority of the
17-acre science park and has a wide range
of laboratory facilities including class 2
containment facilities for work in genomic
and cell biology.  Potential spin-out com-
panies are full and easily accommodated
on-site. 
E. Financial resources. There is not dedicated
fund for potential spin-outs in TTP but
spin-out companies are rather funded
from income.  Development work in TTP is
split with 50% being undertaken on a
contract basis for external clients and 50%
as in-house development work.  Hence
income is generated from development
and consultancy work done under con-
tract, from licenses from earlier develop-
ment work and from revenue from manu-
facture of instruments and systems.  
F. Social resources. As an organization TTP is
recognized as one of a small number of
technical consultancy firms, which have
become a notable feature of the Cam-
bridge high tech environment.  Also at the
organizational level its activities con-
tribute to the exchange of personnel at all
levels not just those with scientific or
technical backgrounds but those from
legal and commercial backgrounds. Tech-
nically, commercially and financially TTP
Group plc has strong and extensive links
within the Cambridge area and beyond.
At an individual level, many of the
founders and senior members of the com-
pany are notable figures in the Cambridge
Network. 
Activities
A. Opportunity seeking. TTP is a rather unique
organization, with an extremely flat struc-
ture, operating on strongly egalitarian
principles. It has sought to develop a cul-
ture of ‘structured autonomy’ under which
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spin-outs. This was one of the reasons
why the Twinning could not find attrac-
tive projects. 
B. Human resources. A professional staff
from a wide variety of backgrounds and
disciplines and is able to draw upon ‘in
house’ specialists in particular technolo-
gies. It is very important to stress that the
successful models of this kind are centres
of excellence built around a small num-
ber of leading edge researchers, prefer-
ably with sufficient business experience
and charisma. Such individuals are not
easily found on the labour market and it
takes time to train them. 
C. Technological resources. The centres of
excellence are relatively narrowly focused
on particular specialisms, in which they
have a wealth of experience. The distinc-
tion between fundamental and applied
research is not important, but breadth is.
For example, Scientific Generics claims
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researchers are given considerable freedom
and resources to explore potential projects.
There are no formal structures or mecha-
nisms defining the amount of time and
resources individuals or groups can spend
on potential developments, rather such
limits come to be ‘understood’.  The culture
encourages people to experiment and to
‘spot’ opportunities suitable for develop-
ment and exploitation through licensing,
collaboration or spin-outs arising within
both from in-house and contract based
development work. 
B. IPR assessment and protection. TTP
Group owns all the IPR in respect of its
developments, occasionally, depending on
the nature of the external contract, this
might be shared with another organisa-
tion or client.  It is highly active in patent-
ing filing some 25 per annum.
C. Selection of the spin-out process.
Selection of a project is based on three cri-
teria: technical novelty, commercial viabil-
ity and the opportunity to obtain a com-
petitive advantage (whether TTP has the
capacity to do as good or better job than
anyone else.) From this point on the proj-
ect is treated as a formal proposal, with
clearly set objectives and subject to moni-
toring on exactly the same basis as a proj-
ect undertaken for an external client.
D. Incubation process. All aspects of the incu-
bation process and commercial planning
are fully supported in-house since once
selected the potential spin-out project is
undertaken on the same basis as an exter-
nal project. 
E. Funding. For two reasons TTP seldom seek
venture capital or any form of public sec-
tor support for the development of poten-
tial spin-out projects.  First they are under-
taken as part and parcel of TTP’s overall
activities and as such funded from current
income, and second the very late stage at
which separation of spin-out companies
occurs in TTP. In 1998 TTP Group plc set up
TTP Ventures limited as a wholly owned
subsidiary. The principal investors in this
venture fund, which has a total commit-
ment of 58 million, are NPM Capital (the
largest and oldest independent venture
group in the Netherlands), The Boeing
Company, Siemens Venture Capital and
Abbey National.  TTP Ventures invests in
external (to TTP) early stage companies in
the UK and Europe, specializing in compa-
nies in technologies, which map closely
onto those of TTP. Investments range from
seed 83,000 to a maximum of 5 million
from TTP Ventures alone (additional sums
being available from syndication part-
ners.)
F. Control of the spin-out process. TTP’s
approach is that setting up a new techno-
logy business is an extremely difficult and
risky process. Consequently potential spin-
out companies remains within the protec-
tive environment of TTP as profit centres
for a very long time. They will either move
to become totally owned subsidiaries or
‘demerged’. At the stage of demerging the
‘spin-out’ will have a well developed man-
agement structure, usually built around
the TTP researchers who championed the
project, but may include outsiders, a
proven track record and is likely to be a
substantial venture e.g. employing more
than 100. TTP’s last demerger of TTP
Communications Ltd. went almost directly
to IPO. 
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not to be involved in fundamental
research, but is more involved in ‘develop-
ment”. But Scientific Generics is a recog-
nized specialist in its particular narrow
field. IMEC claims to be the leading insti-
tute in microelectronics. 
D. Physical resources. Because the origin of
each spin off company lies within the lab,
internal office space is offered for free
and infrastructure is available. This model
keeps its spin outs within the protective
environment of the “parent”. TTP has
extensive physical resources on-site at its
location on the Melbourne Science Park
to the south of Cambridge. 
E. Financial resources. The financial re-
sources needed to set up this kind of
model are substantial. First, a large
investment is needed to create a centre
of excellence; In the IMEC case this was
only possible because the Flemish govern-
ment has invested each year about 30
million euro in the institute since its
inception in 1984. The first spin-outs date
from the early nineties and the successful
ones were only generated in the second
half of the nineties. By then, IMEC had its
reputation and a steady stream of con-
tract research revenues. Generics has a
different history, since no public money
was involved. However, the personal
wealth and network of its founder,
Gordon Edge, who was also involved in
the founding of PA Consulting and
Cambridge Consultants (later sold to
Arthur D Little), provided a similar knowl-
edge reputation and sound financial
base. Examples of this kind, which started
up without a sound financial base are
bankrupt today (e.g. Starlab in Belgium
F. Social resources. Because the spin-out serv-
ices effectively manages and supports all
of the stages and processes involved in
research-based spin out creation, the
potential for the entrepreneurial context
to add to the support is quite low. The
spin-out services are self-contained and
self-sufficient. Generics is one of a small
number of technical consultancy firms,
which have become a notable feature of
the Cambridge high tech environment.
Generics, and especially its founder
Gordon Edge have a very high profile in
the local Cambridge business environment. 
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This paper posed the research question: “how
are spin-out services organised and can we
detect different patterns in their activities
and resources?” In addressing this question,
we have identified three distinct spin-out
models, which follow a different trajectory:
the low selectivity model, the supportive
model and the protective model. This paper
concludes by discussing the implications for
researchers, practitioners and policy and the
suggestions for further research.
The low selectivity model aims at creating as
many spin-outs as possible. The basis for
spin-out activity cannot only be a distinctive
technology. The company can as well be
based upon a skill developed at the univer-
sity. The result is that many companies are
created but only few have a growth ambi-
tion and even fewer realize growth.
Nevertheless, these companies might be of
crucial importance in terms of regional
development and the formation of high
tech clusters. In the low selectivity model,
public money is crucial. Instead of providing
the spin-outs equity financing, small grants
are given to entrepreneurs and cheap office
space is provided. Private money is not use-
ful for this purpose. 
The supportive model aims at creating com-
panies with a growth ambition (although
this growth ambition might not be proven
at the moment of start-up). Therefore, the
basis for start-up is usually some piece of
technology that can be protected and pro-
vide a unique advantage. Pure knowledge
based consulting firms are usually not sup-
ported in this model. Usually, business plans
form the basis for selection. However,
because the growth might be unclear at
start and – related – the amount of start-up
capital remains rather low, private VCs tend
not to be interested in these start-ups. On
the other hand, these VCs usually have a
better knowledge to evaluate the business
potential of a start-up. Therefore, we
observe that these spin-out models tend to
form public-private partnerships. The public
money is used to finance the management
of the fund and the coaching for the entre-
preneurs, while the private part serves to
finance the investment. To run such a spin-
out service, different skills are needed from
the previous one. In addition, the number of
spin-outs tends to be limited in comparison
to the previous model.
The protective model sees spin-outs as one
trajectory of commercialising research
results. A spin-out will only be formed if a
patent portfolio can be constructed which is
broad and strong enough. This means that
at start it must already be clear that the
company can establish a growth trajectory.
External VCs are attracted from the very
beginning. A crucial competence of these
spin-out services is an in depth knowledge
of certain technology domains. These insti-
tutes all tend to be specialised in a very spe-
cific technology. Those that were not such as
Twinning and Starlab either had to change
their mission or simply went bankrupt. A
second key resource is money. It takes a very
long time and an enormous amount of
money to create a scientific centre of excel-
lence. The Starlab case clearly illustrates that
60 million Euro is far from sufficient. The
IMEC case shows that it can take up to
twenty years and a tenfold of the Starlab
investment to build such a centre.
In further research, we will analyse whether
and how the institutional context forces
spin-out services to organise their activities
using the resources they have. Resource
dependency theory will be a point of depar-
ture to analyse the deviation from the three
models that seem to work.
C h a p t e r  4 CONCLUSIONS
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ACTIVITIES
Technology opportunity
search
Intellectual property
assessment and protection
Selection of the spin-out
project
Incubation and business
plan development
Funding process
Support with start-up
process
LOW SELECTIVITY 
MODEL
Based upon Crealys 
and Twente 
Rather passive, relies on
entrepreneurial university
Emphasis on commercialis-
ing technology through
patents
Selection criteria are
extremely low. Maximize
the spin-outs
Projects are offered space
at the research centre or
university 
small amounts,
ranging from 15 000 Euro
to 100 000 Euro, under
the form of public grants
Project is started at a pre-
founding stage. All types
of start-up are selected 
SUPPORTIVE 
MODEL
Based upon Leuven R&D
and BioM 
Passive; might organize a
business plan competition;
attracting business plans
rather than ideas; relies on
the reputation of the fund
Support in patent and
license negotiation with
the industry
Among the selection crite-
ria, growth orientation is
important. But, remain
lower than in private VCs 
Incubation centre and
Science park; Specialized
support available out
house at market prices
Public private equity fund,
ranging from 250 000
Euro to 350 000 Euro
Spin off company is start
up at a very early stage,
focus upon transitional
starters
PROTECTIVE 
MODEL
Based upon IMEC, TTP,
Scientific Generics
Active opportunity seek-
ing worldwide
TTO will acquire an IPR
platform (not limited to
one patent) at an early
stage
Selection criteria resemble
those of the VCs
‘In house’ incubation and
support at all stages of
the spin out process and
to a high level
VC money, ranging from 1
mio Euro to 4 mio Euro 
Spin off company is start
up in a late stage and
with an experienced man-
agement team 
CHAPTER 4  > Conclusions
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RESOURCES
Organizational resources
Human resources
Technological resources
Physical resources
Financial resources
Social resources
Public organizations,
linked with universities
Small team, familiar with
public sector
No technological focus or
specialisms
Offer office space and
infrastructure within the
universities
Need a large amount of
public money to offer at
the spin-outs
Entrepreneurial climate
within university or
research centre is very
important
Private organizations
linked with universities
Larger (5-7 persons) multi-
disciplinary team, with
links to the financial world
to be able to evaluate the
business plans 
Focus on the best per-
forming departments of
the universities
Mainly applied research
Offer office space and
infrastructure within an
incubation centre, at mar-
ket prices
Need to set up an associ-
ated fund with public/pri-
vate partners
Entrepreneurial context is
very important
Centre of excellence, close
link with industry
Experienced professional
staff. Able to draw upon
‘in house’ specialists 
Relatively narrowly
focused on particular spe-
cialisms in which it has a
wealth of experience 
Internal research space
and infrastructure is
offered for free
Invested money is private
money, the TTO may have
its own VC fund 
Entrepreneurial context is
scarcely important
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